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Abstract
Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms
for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of pro-
moting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize
the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of
discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on
scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to
provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to
be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the high-
est possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and
solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular,
we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for mini-
mizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also
solve the problem of computing the set of individuals to be incentivized
for maximizing the outreach size for given cost budget. The optimization
problem turns out to be non trivial; it involves quantities that need to
be computed by numerically solving a fixed point equation. Our primary
contribution is, that for a fairly general cost structure, we show that the
optimization problems can be solved by solving a simple linear program.
We believe that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an
optimization problem is the first of its kind.
1 Introduction
Online social networking platforms are being increasingly used by campaigners,
activists and marketing managers for promoting ideas, brands and products. In
particular, the ability to recommend news articles [1], videos, and even products
[2] by friends and acquaintances through online social networking platforms is
being increasingly recognized by marketing gurus as well as political campaign-
ers and activists. Influencing the spread of content through social media enables
campaigners to mold the opinions of a large group of individuals. In most cases,
campaigners and advertisers aim to spread their message to as many individ-
uals as possible while respecting budget constraints. This calls for a judicious
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allocation of limited resources, like money and manpower, for ensuring highest
possible outreach, i.e., the proportion of individuals who receive the message.
Individuals share information with other individuals in their social network
using Twitter tweets, Facebook posts or simply face to face meetings. These
individuals may in turn pass the same to their friends and so on, leading to
an information epidemic. However, individuals may also become bored or dis-
illusioned with the message over time and decide to stop spreading it. Past
research suggests that such social effects may lead to opinion polarization in so-
cial systems [3]. This can be exploited by a campaigner who desires to influence
such spreading or opinion formation by incentivizing individuals to evangelize
more vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of dis-
counts, cash back or other attractive offers. Due to budget constraints, it may
not be feasible to incentivize all, or even a majority of the population. Indi-
viduals have varying amount of influence over others, e.g., ordinary individuals
may have social connections extending to only close family and friends, while
others may have a large number of social connections which can enable them to
influence large groups [4]. Thus, it would seem that incentivizing highly influ-
ential individuals would be the obvious strategy. However, recruiting influential
people can be very costly, which may result in the campaigner running out of
funds after recruiting just a handful of celebrities, which in turn may result in
suboptimal outreach size.
A resource constrained campaigner, for a given cost budget, may want to
maximize the proportion of informed individuals, while other campaigners who
care more about campaign outreach than resource costs, may desire to minimize
costs for achieving a given number of informed individuals. We address both
the resource allocation challenges by formulating and solving two optimization
problems with the help of bond percolation theory.
A similar problem of preventing epidemics through vaccinations has received
a lot of attention [5–9]. However, in these problems the cost of vaccination is
uniform for all individuals, and hence it is sufficient to calculate the minimum
number of vaccinations. Information diffusion can also be maximized by select-
ing an optimal set of seeds, i.e., individuals best suited to start an epidemic
[10–12]. This is different from our strategy which involves incentivizing individ-
uals to spread the message. It is possible to address the problem posed here
using optimal control theory, which involves computing the optimal resource
allocation in real time for ensuring maximum possible outreach size by a give
deadline [13–17]. However, the optimal control solution is not only difficult to
compute, but also very hard to implement as it requires a centralized real time
controller. Furthermore, recent work, [13–17], on optimal campaigning in social
networks does not address the problem of minimizing the cost while gurantering
an outreach size. Our formulation allows us to solve both the problems.
Our model assumes two types of individuals viz. the ‘ordinary’ and the
‘selected’, and they are connected to one another through a social network. Be-
fore the campaign starts, the selected individuals are incentivized to spread the
message more vigorously than the ordinary. We use the Susceptible Infected
Recovered (SIR) model for modeling the information epidemic. For a given set
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of selected individuals, we first calculate the size of the information outbreak us-
ing network percolation theory, and then find the set of selected nodes which, 1.
minimizes the cost for achieving a given proportion of informed individuals, and
2. maximize the fraction of informed individual for a given cost budget. We be-
lieve that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an optimization
problem is the first of its kind.
The detailed model description can be found in Sec. 2, percolation analysis
in Sec. 3, the problem formulation in Sec. 4, numerical results in Sec. 5, and
finally conclusions are discussed in Sec. 6.
2 Model
We divide the total population of N individuals in two types: the ordinary
(type 1) and the selected (type 2). Before the campaign starts selected individ-
uals are provided incentives to spread the information more vigorously. These
individuals are connected with one another through a social network, which
is represented by an undirected graph (network). Nodes represent individuals
while a link embodies the communication pathways between individuals.
Let P (k) be the degree distribution of the social network. For analytical
tractability, we assume that the network is uncorrelated [18]. We generate an
uncorrelated network using the configuration model [19]. A sequence of N inte-
gers, called the degree sequence, is obtained by sampling the degree distribution.
Thus each node is associated with an integer which is assumed to be the num-
ber of half edges or stubs associated with the node. Assuming that the total
number of stubs is even, each stub is chosen at random and joined with another
randomly selected stub. The process continues until all stubs are exhausted.
Self loops and multiple edges are possible, but the number of such self loops
and multiple edges goes to zero as N → ∞ with high probability. We assume
that N is large but finite. Let φ(k) be the proportion of individuals with k
degrees that are provided incentives for vigorously spreading the message, i.e.,
proportion of nodes with degree k that are type 2 nodes. The goal is to find the
optimum φ(k) for maximizing the epidemic size (or minimizing the cost). The
actual individuals can be identified by sampling from a population of individuals
with degree k with probability φ(k).
We assume that the information campaign starts with a randomly chosen
individual, who may pass the information to her neighbors, who in turn may
pass the same to their neighbors and so on. However, as the initial enthusi-
asm wanes, individuals may start loosing interest in spreading the information
message. This is similar to the diffusion of infectious diseases in a population
of susceptible individuals. Since, we account for individuals loosing interest in
spreading the message, we use a continuous time SIR process to model the in-
formation diffusion. The entire population can be divided into three classes,
those who haven’t heard the message (susceptible class), those who have heard
it and are actively spreading it (infected class) and those who have heard the
message but have stopped spreading it (recovered class).
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Let β1 be the rate of information spread for an ordinary node (Type 1), while
β2 for a selected node (Type 2). In other words, the probability that a type
i individual ‘infects’ her susceptible neighbors in small time dt is βidt + o(dt).
Note that this is independent of the type of the susceptible node. Let µi be
the rate at which type i infected individuals move to the recovered state. The
larger the µi the lesser the time an individual spends in spreading the message.
Since type 2 individuals are incentivized to spread information more vigorously,
β2 > β1 and µ2 < µ1. Let Ti be the probability that a type i infected node
infects its susceptible neighbors (any type) before it recovers (i ∈ {0, 1}). It
can be easily shown that Ti =
βi
βi+µi
, see [20]. Therefore, T2 > T1. Ti can be
interpreted as the probability that a link connecting type i infected node to any
susceptible node is occupied. We refer to such links as type i links and Ti the
occupation probability for link of type i. This mapping allows us to apply bond
percolation theory for obtaining the size of the information epidemic [21].
3 Analysis
We first aim to calculate the proportion of individuals who have received the
message, or in other words, the proportion of recovered individuals at t → ∞.
Let P (k′ | k) be the probability of encountering a node of degree k′ by traversing
a randomly chosen link from a node of degree k. In other words, P (k′ | k) is
the probability that a node with degree k has a neighbor with degree k′. For a
network generated by configuration model, P (k′ | k) = k′P (k′)〈k〉 [21], where 〈ki〉
is the ith moment of P (k).
Let q be the probability of encountering a type 2 node by traversing a ran-
domly chosen link from a node of degree k. Therefore, q =
∞∑
k′=1
Pr(Neighboring
node is type 2 | neighboring node has degree k′) · Pr(Neighboring node has
degree k′ | original node has degree k).
q =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k)
The probability that a randomly chosen node has k1 type 1 and k2 type 2
neighbors = P (k1, k2) =
∞∑
k:k=k1+k2
Pr(k1, k2 |node has degree k)P (k).
For a large N , the event that a given node has degree k, can be approximated
to be independent of the event that another node, having a common neighbor
with the given node, has degree k′. This is true since the degree sequence is
generated by independent samples from the distribution, and for a large N the
effect of sampling without replacement is negligible. The probability that a
node is selected (type 2), is a function of its degree, hence the event that a node
is type 1 (or 2) is independent of the event that any other node is type 1 (or 2).
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Generating function Distribution
G(u1, u2) P (k1, k2)
F (u1, u2) Q(k1, k2)
G˜(u1, u2) P˜ (k˜1, k˜2)
F˜ (u1, u2) Q˜(k˜1, k˜2)
H˜i(u1, u2) Proportion of type 1 and type 2 nodes,
who have received the message, in a component
reached from a type i link.
J˜i(u1, u2) No. of type 1 and type 2 nodes
who have received the message, in a component
reached from a node i.
J˜(u1, u2) No. of type 1 and type 2 nodes
who have received the message, in a component
reached from a randomly chosen node.
Table 1: List of probability generating functions.
This allows us to write:
P (k1, k2) =
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k1P (k1 + k2)
Let Q(k) be the excess degree distribution, i.e., the degree distribution of a node
arrived at by following a randomly chosen link without counting that link. For
the configuration model Q(k) = (k + 1)P (k + 1)/ < k >. Let Q(k1, k2) be the
excess degree distribution for connections to type 1 and type 2 nodes.
Q(k1, k2) =
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k1Q(k1 + k2)
Let P˜ (k˜1, k˜2) and Q˜(k˜1, k˜2) be the distribution and the excess distribution of
the number of type 1 and type 2 neighbors that have received the information
message. In other words the distribution and the excess distribution of type i
occupied links.
P˜ (k˜1, k˜2) =
∞∑
k1=k˜1
∞∑
k2=k˜2
P (k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T k˜ii (1− Ti)ki−k˜i
Q˜(k˜1, k˜2) =
∞∑
k1=k˜1
∞∑
k2=k˜2
Q(k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T k˜ii (1− Ti)ki−k˜i
The probability generating functions for the distributions used in the analysis
above are listed in Table 1. For example G(u1, u2) is given by :
G(u1, u2) =
∞∑
k1,k2=0
uk11 u
k2
2 P (k1, k2)
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Figure 1: (Color Online) Illustration of components. The red boxes represent
the components reached by type 1 link while green boxes represent components
reached by a type 2 link. A type 2 node is represented by a green circle while
a red circle represents a type 1 node.
Now, G˜(u1, u2) is given by
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
uk˜11 u
k˜2
2
∑
k1=k˜1
∑
k2=k˜2
P (k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T k˜ii (1− Ti)ki−k˜i
=
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u1 − 1)T1)k1(1 + (u2 − 1)T2)k2P (k1, k2)
= G (1 + (u1 − 1)T1, 1 + (u2 − 1)T2)
Similarly, F˜ (u1, u2) = F (1 + (u1 − 1)T1, 1 + (u2 − 1)T2)
A component is a small cluster of nodes that have received the information
message. By small we mean that the cluster is finite and does not scale with the
network size. However, at the phase transition, the average size of the cluster
diverges (as N →∞). An information epidemic outbreak is possible only when
the average size of the cluster diverges. In this regime the component is termed
as a giant connected component (GCC) and it grows with the network size. Let
H˜i(u1, u2) be the generating function of the distribution of the number of type
1 and type 2 nodes in a component arrived at from a type i link. Let J˜i(u1, u2)
and J˜(u1, u2) be the generating functions of the distribution of the number of
type 1 and type 2 nodes in a component arrived at from node i and a randomly
chosen node, respectively.
Let random variable Yi be the number of type 1 and 2 nodes, that have
received the message, in a component arrived at from a type i link. The proba-
bility of encountering closed loops in finite cluster is O(N−1) [20] which can be
neglected for large N . The tree like structure of the cluster allows us to write
the size of the component encountered by traversing the link, as the sum of the
size of components encountered after traversing the links emanating from the
node at the end of the initial link. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Hence, Yi can
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be written as:
Yi = 1 + K˜1Y1 + K˜2Y2
where random variable K˜i is the number of type i neighbors of the end node
of type i link that have received the message; the arrival link is not counted
(excess degree). Since, the size of the components along different links are
mutually independent (absence of loops) we can write the above equation in
terms of probability generating functions.
H˜i(u1, u2) = uiH˜1(u1, u2)
K˜1H˜2(u1, u2)
K˜2
= ui
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
H˜k11 (u1, u2)H˜
k2
2 (u1, u2)Q˜(k˜1, k˜2)
= uiF˜ (H˜1(u1, u2), H˜2(u1, u2))
Which can also be written as
H˜i(u1, u2) = uiF
(
1 + (H˜1(u1, u2)− 1)T1, 1 + (H˜2(u1, u2)− 1)T2
)
(1)
Similarly, J˜(u1, u2) can be expressed as :
J˜i(u1, u2) = ui
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
H˜k11 (u1, u2)H˜
k2
2 (u1, u2)P˜ (k˜1, k˜2)
= uiG˜(H˜1(u1, u2), H˜2(u1, u2))
J˜(u1, u2) = (1− p)J˜1(u1, u2) + pJ˜2(u1, u2)
where p is the probability of choosing a type 2 node, p =
∞∑
k=1
P (k)φ(k). The
following theorem describes the phase transition conditions required for an out-
break and the size of the such an outbreak. The proof can be found in A.
Theorem 1. The condition required for a small cluster to become a giant con-
nected component is given by: ν˜ ≥ 1, where
ν˜ = T1
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1, k2) + T2
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1, k2)
and the proportion of nodes in the giant connected component (size of GCC) is
given by 1− ψ,
ψ =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u∗ − 1)T1)k1(1 + (u∗ − 1)T2)k2P (k1, k2)
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where u∗ is the solution of the fixed point equation
u =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)k1(1 + (u− 1)T2)k2Q(k1, k2)
The size of the information epidemic outbreak can now be used for formu-
lating the optimization problem.
4 Problem Formulation
Providing incentives in the form of referral rewards for low degree nodes, or
sponsorship offers for celebrities (high degree nodes) is costly. Since, the cost is
a function of the degree let c(k) be the cost of providing incentivizing a node with
degree k. The average cost, c¯(φ), is given by
∞∑
k=1
c(k)Pr(node is selected | node
has degree k)P (k) =
∞∑
k=1
c(k)φ(k)P (k). The proportion of type 2 individuals is
given by
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k).
We formulate two optimization problems, viz., one which minimizes cost
while enforcing a lower bound on the epidemic size, and the other which max-
imizes the epidemic size for a given cost budget. For both the problems, the
evaluation of the size of the epidemic requires one to numerically solve a fixed
point equation. Thus, there is no straightforward method to solve the opti-
mization problem such as the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions, because
evaluating the objective function requires one to solve a fixed point equation.
We show that this problem can be reduced to a linear program, which can then
be solved easily using any off the shelf LP solver.
4.1 Cost minimization problem
Providing guarantees on the minimum number of individuals who will be in-
formed about the campaign is appropriate for campaigns with large funding,
such as election campaigns where message penetration is more important than
the cost. The guarantee on epidemic size is written as a constraint to the op-
timization problem. The cost c¯(φ) is minimized subject to 1 − ψ ≥ γ where
γ ∈ [0, 1] and φ is the control variable. If γ = 0, the constraint becomes
ν˜ ≤ 1, as γ = 0 implies ψ = 1 which is the same as ν˜ ≤ 1. A finite amount of
money, may put a constraint on the number of type 2 individuals. The propor-
tion of type 2 individuals is given by
∑∞
k=1 φ(k)P (k). This translates in to the
constraint :
∑∞
k=1 φ(k)P (k) ≤ B, where budget B ∈ [0, 1].
The following theorem which is our principle contribution allows us to solve
a possible non convex problem by solving a linear program. The key insight is
that the probability of outbreak is monotonically decreasing in q, which then
allows one to write the optimization problem as a linear program. The intuition
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behind this claim is that since q is the probability of finding a type 2 node on
a randomly chosen link, increase in q is equivalent to the increase in number of
type 2 individuals resulting in a higher epidemic size.
Theorem 2. If T2 > T1, then ψ ∈ (0, 1), is strictly decreasing with respect to q,
i.e, dψdq < 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. For the ψ = 0 case (ν˜ ≥ 1), ν˜ is strictly increasing
with respect to q, i.e, dν˜dq > 0, ∀ q ∈ [0, 1], where q = 1〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 4 and 5 detailed in Appendix B.
Since, dψdq < 0, the epidemic size constraint can be written as
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k) ≥
q∗, where ψ(q) |q=q∗ = 1− γ. The optimization problem can now be written as
follows:
minimize
φ
∞∑
k=1
c(k)φ(k)P (k)
subject to:
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k) ≥ q∗
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k) ≤ B
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
(2)
The above problem is a linear program which can be solved by any off-the-shelf
LP solver.
The optimization problem described above may not be feasible for all values
of T1 and for all possible degree distributions. Assume, B = 1, the problem
becomes infeasible if 1− ψ ≤ γ when T2 is at the maximum possible value, i.e.,
all individuals are incentivized and yet 1− ψ ≤ γ.
4.2 Epidemic Size Maximization Problem
We now look at the problem of maximizing the information epidemic size (out-
reach) in a resource constrained scenario. More, specifically we study a scenario
where the cost budget is finite. Thus the outbreak size 1 − ψ must be maxi-
mized subject to a cost constraint. Since dψdq < 0, maximizing q is equivalent
to maximizing 1 − ψ. Thus the problem is equivalent to the following linear
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program.
maximize
φ
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k)
subject to:
∞∑
k=1
c(k)φ(k)P (k) ≤ C
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k) ≤ B
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
(3)
The linear program can now be solved using any standard linear programing
solver. Note that constants T1, T2 do not play any role in problem (3), while
they do play a role in problem (2) because q∗ is a function of T1 and T2.
5 Numerical Results
As an illustration, we study the solution of the optimization problem for a linear
cost, i.e., c(k) = k. The higher the degree, the higher the cost. Note that even
if cost is non linear in k, the optimization problem remains a linear program.
In the real world, the cost may be different, but whatever the cost function, the
solution can be obtained by simply solving a linear program.
We used an uncorrelated random graph generated using the configuration
model technique with power law degree distribution (P (k) ∝ k−α), α = 2.5.
5.1 Cost Minimization Problem
We solved the cost minimization linear program using the ‘linprog ’ MATLAB
solver; q∗ was computed numerically using the bisection method. In Fig. 2a,
we plot the solution φ for different values of T1. The solution shows that only
about 50% of high degree nodes need to be incetivized for T1 values ranging from
0.3 to 0.43. As T1 decreases from 0.47 to 0.3 , the proportion of high degree
nodes that are incentivized remain fairly constant (50%), while the proportion
of incentivized low degree nodes increase. In Fig. 2b, we plot the optimal
proportion of individuals that need to be incentivized for achieving the given
outreach size.
5.2 Epidemic Size Maximization Problem
The solution, φ, is very similar to the one in problem (2), and hence we do
not show it here. In Fig. 3a, we plot the size of the epidemic for varying cost
budget C. As expected, the epidemic size increases with C because higher the
budget, the higher the proportion of incentivized individuals. However, at some
10
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Figure 2: (Color Online) (a) Solution φ, for different values of T1; (b) Optimal
proportion of type 2 nodes required to meet outreach constraint. Parameters:
T2 = 0.6, B = 0.7, γ = 0.2.
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Figure 3: (Color Online) (a) Size of the information epidemic for varying cost
budget (C). (b) Optimal proportion of type 2 nodes required to meet outreach
constraint as a function of cost budget (C). Parameters: T2 = 0.6, B = 0.7.
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point epidemic size saturates, this is because all nodes have been incentivized
and therefore nothing more can be done to increase the outreach size. This is
verified by Fig. 3b, the fraction of type 2 nodes hit 1, when C = 3.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
To summarize, we studied the problem of maximizing information spreading in
a social networks. More specifically, we considered a scenario where individuals
are incentivized to vigorously spread the campaign message to their neighbors,
and we proposed a mechanism to identify the individuals who should be ince-
tivized. Using bond percolation theory we calculated the size of the information
epidemic outbreak and the conditions for the occurrence of such outbreaks. We
then formulated an optimization problem for minimizing the expected cost of in-
centivizing individuals while providing guarantees on the information epidemic
size. Although the optimization problem could not be addressed using standard
analytical tools, Theorem 2 enabled us to compute the global optimum by solv-
ing a linear program. We believe that our approach of using percolation theory
to formulate an optimization problem is the first of its kind.
For the sake of analytical tractability we assumed an uncorrelated network,
however in reality real world social networks have positive degree-degree cor-
relations [22]. Such networks with positive degree associativity percolate more
easily compared to uncorrelated networks [23, 24]. Therefore, for the problem
of minimizing cost the given campaign size could be achieved with a slightly
lesser cost, while in the second problem, the theoretical optimal size would be
a lower bound and the actual campaign size would be slightly larger than the
theoretical. Apart from positive degree associativity, social networks are also
found to contain community structures [22]. The presence of communities may
slow down information spreading leading to a reduction in the campaign size.
This may happen as most links point inside the community rather than out-
side it, thus localizing the information spread [25]. However, if the network
contains high degree nodes that bridge different communities, then incetivizing
such nodes may substantially increase the campaign size. A similar finding was
reported in [26], where authors investigated usefulness of targeted vaccinations
on nodes that bridge communities.
Although SIR models are widely used to model epidemics, they have some
limitations. They fail to capture the fact that individuals may stop spreading
when they perceive that most of their neighbors already known the information.
This is captured by the Maki-Thompson model [27] which forces the recovery
rate to be an increasing function of the number of informed individuals she
contacts. Thus the recovery rate for an infected node is a function of her degree.
An SIR process has a fixed recovery rate and hence the current results would
approximately hold for an Maki Thompson process on Erdos-Renyi networks,
where every node on average has the same degree. However, our results for SIR
may not generalize for the Maki Thompson spread model on scale free networks.
High degree nodes may have a higher chance of being connected to informed
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individuals which may lead them to stop spreading to other uninformed nodes.
An interesting extension to this problem, which was suggested by the anony-
mous referee, is to compute a targeted incentivization strategy for two interact-
ing campaigns. For example, the campaigner may want to maximize campaign
A given that campaign B, which has either run its course or is simultaneously
running along with A, either reinforces or hinders campaign A. This is an
important problem since such interacting campaigns are often observed during
parliamentary or presidential elections. Although the current results may not
shed much light on such questions, we believe that they lay the foundation for
investigating such problems which we hope to address in the future.
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let 〈s1〉 and 〈s2〉 be the average number of type 1 and type 2 nodes in
the component. The expected number of nodes in the component, < s >, is
given by:
〈s〉 = 〈s1〉+ 〈s2〉
=
∂
∂u1
J˜(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
+
∂
∂u2
J˜(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
After differentiating and simplifying, 〈s1〉 can be written as:
〈s1〉 = (1− p) + 〈k˜1〉H˜ ′1(1, 1) + 〈k˜2〉H˜
′
2(1, 1)
where 〈k˜i〉 =
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
k˜iP˜ (k˜1, k˜2) and
H˜
′
i (1, 1) =
∂
∂u1
H˜i(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
H˜
′
i (1, 1) can be obtained by differentiating equation (1).
H˜
′
1(1, 1) = 1 + T1k¯1H˜
′
1(1, 1) + T2k¯2H˜
′
2(1, 1)
H˜
′
2(1, 1) = T1k¯1H˜
′
1(1, 1) + T2k¯2H˜
′
2(1, 1)
where k¯i =
∞∑
k1,k2
kiQ(k1, k2). Solving the two simultaneous equations we ob-
tain H˜
′
1(1, 1) =
1−T2k¯2
1−T1k¯1−T2k¯2 and H˜
′
2(1, 1) =
T1k¯1
1−T1k¯1−T2k¯2 . Substituting in the
expression for 〈s1〉 we get.
〈s1〉 = (1− p) + 〈k˜1〉(1− T2k¯2) + 〈k˜2〉T1k¯1
1− T1k¯1 − T2k¯2
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One can similarly show that:
〈s2〉 = p+ 〈k˜1〉T2k¯2 + 〈k˜2〉(1− T1k¯1)
1− T1k¯1 − T2k¯2
Therefore,
〈s〉 = 1 + 〈k˜1〉+ 〈k˜2〉
1− T1k¯1 − T2k¯2
Thus, when T1k¯1 + T2k¯2 ≥ 1, 〈s〉 is no longer finite, it morphs into a giant con-
nected component, or in other words there is an information epidemic outbreak.
Assume that a giant connected component of exists (ν˜ ≥ 1). For any given
node let zi be the probability that one of its type i links does not lead to the
giant connected component. The probability that a randomly chosen node is
not a part of the GCC is given by
ψ =
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
zk11 z
k2
2 P (k1, k2)
Now, zi can be written as Pr(link is not occupied ) + Pr(link is occupied and
the neighbor is not connected to the GCC). By occupied we mean that the node
at the end of the link is a believer. Mathematically this can be written as:
z1 = 1− T1 + T1
∞∑
k1,k2
zk11 z
k2
2 Q(k1, k2)
z2 = 1− T2 + T2
∞∑
k1,k2
zk11 z
k2
2 Q(k1, k2)
Simplifying we obtain, (z1 − 1)/T1 = (z2 − 1)/T2. Let u := (z1 − 1)/T1 + 1.
Hence, zi = 1 + (u − 1)Ti. Note that zi is bounded from below by 1 − Ti and
bounded from above by 1, and hence 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Substituting this in above
equations we obtain the desired result:
ψ =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)k1(1 + (u− 1)T2)k2P (k1, k2)
where u must satisfy
u =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)k1(1 + (u− 1)T2)k2Q(k1, k2)
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B Lemmas required for Theorem 4.1
Lemma 3 is used in the proof of Lemma 4 and 5.
Lemma 3. For all a, b ∈ [0, 1] and k1 + k2 ≤ n, n ∈ Z+ and any arbitrary
f : Z → R the following is true:
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2−1bk1
−
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k1
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2bk1−1 = 0
Proof. We can switch the indices in the second term, i.e.,
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k1
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2bk1−1
=
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak1bk2−1
Hence,
LHS =
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
ak2−1bk1 − ak1bk2−1
)
=
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
g(k1, k2) (4)
We now count the number of terms in the above equation and show that they are
even. An expression indexed by a specific k1 and k2 denotes a term, e.g, g(1, 1)
is a term. The total number of terms in the summation =
n+1∑
i=1
i = (n+1)(n+2)2 .
Out of those, n+1 terms are 0 due to the k2 multiplier (k2 = 0 for k1 = 0 to n).
Additionally, when k2 = k1 + 1 equation (4) is zero. The total number of terms
when k2 = k1 + 1 is given by
⌊
n+1
2
⌋
.
Since, these terms are zero, subtracting out these terms from the total num-
ber of terms results in
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
2
− (n+ 1)−
⌊
n+ 1
2
⌋
=
n2
2
for n even
=
(n− 1)(n+ 1)
2
for n odd
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Thus, the remaining terms are even for both n odd and even. This allows
us to pair the terms. Consider one such pairing: the term with indices k1, k2
are paired with a term with indices kˆ1, kˆ2 where kˆ2 = k1 + 1 and kˆ1 = k2 − 1.
If we sum these two terms we obtain
g(k1, k2) + g(kˆ1, kˆ2)
= f(k1 + k2)a
k2−1bk1
(
k2(k1 + k2)!
k1!k2!
− k2(k1 + k2)!
k1!k2!
)
+ f(k1 + k2)a
k1bk2−1
(
(k1 + 1)(k1 + k2)!
(k2 − 1)!(k1 + 1)! −
(k1 + 1)(k1 + k2)!
(k2 − 1)!(k1 + 1)!
)
= 0
Thus, the summation of the remaining terms is zero, which completes the
proof.
Lemma 4. If T2 > T1 then ν˜ is strictly increasing with respect to q, i.e,
dν˜
dq >
0, ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
Proof.
dν˜
dq
=T1
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
+ T2
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
where r = 1− q. Let,
a1 =
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
a2 =
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
Adding a1 and a2 we get
a1 + a2 =
∞∑
k1,k2
(k1 + k2)Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
Since N is large but finite, Q(k1 +k2) = 0 for k1 +k2 > kmax, where kmax is
the maximum degree. From Lemma 3, a1 + a2 = 0. Now we prove that a2 > 0.
Let k1 + k2 = m.
a2 =
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)
[
1
q
m∑
k2=0
k22
(
m
k2
)
qk2rm−k2 − 1
r
m∑
k1=0
k1(m− k1)
(
m
k1
)
qm−k1rk1
]
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The summations are the second moments of a binomial random variable. E
[
X2
]
=
V ar [X] + E [X]
2
, E[X] = mq, V ar[X] = mqr.
a2 =
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)
[
1
q
(mqr +m2q2)− 1
r
(m2r −mqr −m2r2)
]
=
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)m
> 0
Since T2 > T1, T1a1 + T2a2 > 0, which completes the proof.
Lemma 5. For ψ ∈ (0, 1), if T2 > T1 then ψ is strictly decreasing with respect
to q, i.e, dψdq < 0, ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let, ψ = g(u∗, q) where u∗ is the solution of the fixed point equation
u = f(u, q).
g(u∗, q) =
∞∑
k1,k2
αk1βk2P (k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k1
f(u, q) =
∞∑
k1,k2
αk1βk2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k1
where α = 1+(u∗−1)T1 and β = 1+(u∗−1)T2. We first show that the solution
to the fixed point equation is strictly decreasing with q .
Let us consider the behavior of the R.H.S of the fixed point equation, f(u, q),
w.r.t. q. Now
∂f(u, q)
∂q
=
∞∑
k1,k2
αk1βk2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1rk1 − k1qk2rk1−1
)
= β
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k2(βq)
k2−1(αr)k1
− α
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k1(βq)
k2(αr)k1−1
From Lemma 3,
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k2(βq)
k2−1(αr)k1
−
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k1(βq)
k2(αr)k1−1
= 0
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Now α > β because T2 > T1, which implies
∂f(u,q)
∂q < 0.
We use the Implicit Function Theorem for computing the sign of ∂u
∗
∂q . Let
h(u, q) = f(u, q) − u. According to the Implicit Function Theorem when
h(u, q) = 0
du
dq
= −
∂
∂qh(u, q)
∂
∂uh(u, q)
We now show that the derivative exists and is greater than zero. The numerator
∂h(u,q)
∂q =
∂f(u,q)
∂q < 0. The denominator is given by
∂h(u,q)
∂u =
∂f(u,q)
∂u − 1
Claim: ∂f(u,q)∂u < 1 when h(u, q) = 0. We prove this by contradiction.
Assume the contrary, i.e., ∂f(u,q)∂u ≥ 1.
It can be easily shown that ∂f(u,q)∂u > 0 and
∂2f(u,q)
∂u2 > 0 for all u, q ∈ [0, 1].
Thus f is a convex function in u for any fixed q. Also f(0, q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Now h(u, q) = 0 implies that u = f(u, q), or in other words the curve
f(u, q) intersects the line passing through the origin with slope 1. Since we
assumed ∂f(u,q)∂u ≥ 1, i.e., the derivative of f(u, q) is greater than equal to 1
at the intersection, and since f(u, q) is monotone increasing in u, the curve
f(u, q) will never again intersect the line passing through the origin with slope
1. Therefore the equation u = f(u, q) has a unique fixed point. However, this
is a contradiction since u = 1 is always a fixed point and since ψ > 0 there is
another fixed point less than 1. Hence, ∂f(u,q)∂u ≥ 1 is impossible, and therefore
∂f(u,q)
∂u < 1.
Thus, the derivative exists and is less than 0 as ∂h(u,q)∂q < 0 and
∂
∂uh(u, q) < 0.
Since we assumed h(u, q) = 0, the derivative dudq is the derivative of the fixed
point w.r.t q, i.e., it can be represented as du
∗
dq , where u
∗ is the fixed point The
function g(u∗, q) has the same structure as the function f(u, q), and hence using
the same procedure it can be shown that ∂g(u,q)∂q < 0. The total derivative
dψ
dq
is given by:
dψ
dq
=
∂g
∂q
+
∂g
∂u
du∗
dq
Since all the terms on the right hand side of the above equation are negative (g
is a non decreasing function of u), dψdq < 0.
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